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 What would a society look like where children’s life 
chances were really fair? 
 
 
Abstract 
A widely used term in recent decades, the central place ‘life chances’ in UK policy has been 
confirmed by the recent retrospective renaming of the Life Chances Act 2010 (formerly the 
Child Poverty Act 2010). Alongside this, the notion that we should promote fairer life 
chances is gained purchase across the political spectrum. Yet this notion is loose and ill-
defined. This article unpacks the term from the point of view of children. It highlights 
problems involved with defining and measuring fair life chances for children in suitably 
broad and non-partial ways, and argues for a plural measure. It outlines two separate 
dimensions where questions of fairness might apply, in terms of the life course, showing how 
a suitably supple conception of fair life chances would need to apply across both dimensions. 
And in light of this account, it suggests three policy approaches – to poverty, childcare, and 
the configuration of opportunities – which would help establish a society where life chances 
were really fair – not sufficient, but vital contributions. Overall, the article suggests that a 
commitment to making life chances fairer requires considerably more radical steps than the 
term’s recent handling in political discourse would imply. 
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Introduction 
 
Like ‘social exclusion’ in the 1990s, the term ‘life chances’ has in recent years emerged from 
the background to take up a central place in the UK policy landscape. In a general way, this 
term refers to available opportunities – what Max Weber (1978: 302) called, in establishing 
the concept, the ‘probability of procuring goods, gaining a position in life, and finding inner 
satisfaction’. Such opportunities will clearly vary according to social structure, and between 
individuals – and so ‘life chances’ are typically invoked in a comparative sense: in terms of 
whose are better or worse. But they are attributes not of individuals themselves, but rather of 
their relationship to the circumstances in which they live: ‘Individuals have life chances in 
society;… their lives are a response to these chances’ (Dahrendorf 1979: 29). As the usage of 
the term has grown, the idea that in a good society, life chances should be fair has gained 
wide take-up. In its usual handling, ‘fairness’ in this context requires that life chances should 
not be determined by a person’s unchosen, unmerited starting points: the neighbourhood in 
which she grows up, or the wealth or status of her parents. Just as promoting life chances 
seems an uncontroversial, ‘common sense’ agenda, fairness itself may seem self-evidently 
desirable, as a matter of ‘good sense’ (Hall and O’Shea 2013; Bunyan and Diamond 2016). 
And so making life chances fairer is that rare kind of aspiration – along with equality of 
opportunity (Calder 2016, ch, 4) – which is invoked with apparently equal readiness across 
the political spectrum. It has been especially salient in recent Conservative discourse. A ‘Life 
Chances Strategy’ was to have been a cornerstone of David Cameron’s second term as UK 
Prime Minister, before history took its diversionary course (Cameron 2016). We hear it in 
Theresa May’s oft-quoted speech on assuming the role of UK Prime Minister in 2016, 
identifying ‘burning injustices’ in the fact that in the poor still die younger, working class 
boys remain less likely to go to university, and high-status professions are dominated by the 
privately educated (May 2016). We find its political pre-eminence rubber-stamped in the 
renaming, in 2016, of the Child Poverty Act 2010 as the Life Chances Act 2010 (UK 
Government 2016). And we find it in the substance of policy in a range of domains, over 
recent decades.  
 
The nature of that range is key. However defined, life chances are clearly not the province of 
a single government department, or policy direction. They will be significantly shaped by 
local contexts, alongside matters of national policy and global trends. Those shaping factors 
are themselves complex: from the macro to the micro, the structural to the individual. They 
reflect the distribution of resources, alongside attitudinal and cultural determinants. Across 
the governments of the UK, various initiatives since the 1990s have been aimed directly at 
‘levelling the playing field’ between those from different backgrounds – whether via 
education policy, or parent-centred, early childhood-focused services such as Sure Start 
(Eisenstadt 2011), or initiatives aimed primarily at localities of high deprivation, such as 
Wales’s seventeen-year Communities First programme (Welsh Government 2017). Such 
programmes have achieved results, though have also been depleted under austerity (Torjesen 
2016; Smith et al 2018). The ongoing political traction of ‘fairer life chances’ rhetoric is itself 
an indicator of the scale of persisting inequalities. Life chances remain unfair, by any 
plausible measure. 
 
But what would a society look like where life chances were indeed distributed fairly? This 
article considers this question in conceptual and policy terms, specifically from the point of 
view of children. It will argue that taken seriously, a genuine ‘fair life chances’ agenda will be 
far more radical than might be suggested by its ‘vanilla’ overtones, loose definition in policy 
and easy cross-party appeal. It will also argue for a pluralistic understanding of the conditions 
under which fairness would be attainable – but one which allocates due weight to the 
economic. Rather than – as Cameron (2016) intended – switching focus from economic to 
social factors as contributing to the unevenness of life chances, we should reinforce a case for 
reducing income inequality in the foreground of any realistic fair life chances agenda. The 
article has three main sections. The first outlines how we might approach and interpret the 
term ‘fair life chances’, as applied to children. The second considers two dimensions in which 
we might consider whether children’s life chances are fair: respectively childhood itself, and 
destinations reached in future adulthood. And the third proposes three (necessary, but not 
sufficient) elements of a realistic fair life chances policy strategy: the eradication of child 
poverty, investment in childcare, and a commitment to what has been called ‘opportunity 
pluralism’ – a reassessment and opening up of what counts as ‘successful’ taking of the life 
chances on offer. These paint only part of a picture of a good society for children. But that 
part, as will be argued, is vital. 
 
 
Defining and measuring ‘fair life chances’ 
 
As with social mobility, we may compare children’s life chances along two axes (Breen 2010; 
Calder 2016, ch. 3). One is inter-generational: how do members of a given generation fare in 
relation to that of their parents? The other is intra-generational: how do children within a 
cohort but from different backgrounds fare in relation to each other? There are protracted 
debates about how life chances compare between generations, partly reflecting competing 
metrics by which the welfare of different cohorts might be compared (e.g. via 
income/earnings, or class – see Willetts 2011; Blanden et al 2013; Goldthorpe 2013; Payne 
2017; cf Jackson 2016). What counts as ‘fair’ may vary, according to the axis we adopt; 
certainly, separate questions will emerge. Our focus here is on the intra-generational 
comparison, and on the specific implications for fairness which it might carry. Report upon 
report in the UK, from the Social Mobility Commission (2017) to the Child Poverty Action 
Group (2016) and the new Life Chances Inquiry launched in May 2018 (Education 
Committee 2018) will confirm an unsurprising truth: children’s life chances remain 
drastically unevenly distributed. The background a child is born into remains a strong 
indicator of how their life will go. 
 Defining ‘fair life chances’, the political philosopher Joseph Fishkin offers this way of 
extending the initial idea that one’s chances in life should not defend on the circumstances of 
one’s birth. Imagine a hospital ward full of newborn babies. We know their races, genders, 
parents’ income, neighbourhoods – but not their talents or traits. ‘If life chances are fair, we 
should not be able to predict with any degree of accuracy which of them will succeed in life 
and which will fail’ (Fishkin 2016: 27). Two aspects of this definition are worth highlighting 
for our purposes. One is that it looks across the whole life course. So whether one’s life 
chances have been fair is crucially to do with the relationship between where or how one ends 
up – what we might call the destination of one’s life – and where one started. What’s crucial 
for fairness’ sake is that there is no determinate connection between those two points. So if 
there is shock that – as a headline-grabbing 2016 UK study found – 74% of the judiciary, 
61% of doctors, half of top actors and one in five top pop stars were educated at fee-paying 
independent schools, attended by only 7% of the overall population, the objection is to the 
strength of that connection between background and destination (Kirby 2016). The wealth of 
a child’s parents is demonstrably, firmly linked to the likelihood of her becoming a high court 
judge, or getting nominated for a Brit award – and it is in the link that the unfairness lies. 
 
The second aspect concerns what counts as a ‘good’ destination – or in Fishkin’s terms 
‘succeeding’ or ‘failing’ in life. Media scares about unfair life chances follow a clear pattern. 
A given measure of success – such as results in school qualifications gained at 16 or 18, 
admission to university, or access to elite professions – is shown to be achieved much more 
readily by people from privileged backgrounds than by others. This pattern is typified by the 
reception of the Social Mobility Commission’s annual State of the Nation Report (see most 
recently, Social Mobility Commission 2017), which each time sparks a round of concern 
about the lack of progress – and in 2017, indeed, was followed by the resignation of the 
commission, its chair citing as a reason a lack of hope in the government’s commitment to 
‘bring about a fairer Britain’ (Austin 2017). Yet while each such report is illuminating, the 
dominance of certain recurring measures of success needs itself to be handled with critical 
care. While life chances need to be tracked and compared, any one yardstick for so doing will 
be limited and partial and needs to be set alongside other relevant indicators (Calder 2018a: 
53-4). Educational attainment offers only one parameter by which to gauge children’s 
progress – and the status of one’s job is only one among a range of ways in which the value of 
different life achievements might be weighed.  
 
On the one hand, doing justice to the variety of factors in play here requires the deployment 
of a pluralist measure – avoiding reducing the gauging of success to one parameter. We need 
to acknowledge that contributions and rewards are achieved, through a lifetime, in rich and 
diverse ways sitting well outside of what is tracked by academic qualifications, salary levels 
or professional influence – significant though those may also be. Indeed, as we would expect, 
the fullest, most developed frameworks through which to track life chances encompass a 
series of distinct components. A comprehensive analysis by the Fabian Society (2006) 
highlights health, education, income, security, physical environment and social networks as 
focal points, with recommendations cutting across them. Considering measurements for 
children’s life chances specifically, Jonathan Bradshaw (2016, pp.113-5) proposes some 67 
indicators under 10 headings: material, health, subjective well-being and mental health; 
family; early years; education; housing; child maltreatment; children in care; and transition to 
adulthood. Even with that degree of granularity, any such framework needs suppleness built 
in. Bradshaw acknowledges ‘a hierarchy of what is more or less important’, among these, and 
points out that there are ‘good grounds for preferring measures that can be disaggregated by 
income, class, ethnicity, gender, disability, sexuality and other characteristics’ in order to 
appreciate how different dimensions play out among different groups (2016, p.104; cf Child 
Poverty Action Group 2016). But the many-sidedness entailed by any serious such attempt at 
a means by which life chances might be measured makes clear the inadequacy of applying a 
small range of yardsticks, let alone a single one. While they may reinforce each other in 
practice, for better or worse, in principle different categories of progress through the life 
course are importantly different. Educational qualifications are not themselves a measure of 
mental well-being, however mutually implicated they may be. 
 
On the other hand, the dominance of any single, non-comprehensive measure itself may 
positively impede achievement across the full range, precisely by installing an officially 
sanctioned bias towards certain kinds of progress through life. This may wield inhibiting 
effects, for those who flourish in other areas. A low achiever in their school exams at 16 will 
not benefit from being categorized as one who has not succeeded, or holds less potential to. 
And to the extent that he is deemed this way, this may discount or obstruct the view of his 
successes elsewhere: as a carer for example, or as an apprentice. Staking life chances 
academic or professional achievements will not only distract from other plausible markers of 
fulfilment, but may lead to a kind of presumption against those who contribute in those other 
ways that they are somehow achieving less, or indeed less worthy of esteem. Education 
systems are a clear case in point: even with them, pathways and rewards can be configured 
either hierarchically (as epitomized by the grammar school system under the 1944 Education 
Act, with its diverting at age 11 of those deemed academically most robust into grammar 
schools) or in a more even-handed way, as in Germany’s promotion of vocational education 
via a ‘dual system’ route, integrating workplace practice and classroom learning, widely 
recognized as avoiding the inherent bias towards the academic (Winch 2006). While 
education systems will not, by themselves, compensate for wider inequalities in life chances, 
they may certainly help sediment them, for example by reinforcing the senses in which – for 
example – working class children are regarded as having further to travel to ‘success’, and 
thus reinforcing middle class advantage (Brown 2016).  
 
We have focused predominantly in this section on the need, in the promotion of fairer life 
chances, for a suitably plural conception of ‘successful’ destinations in life, of the means by 
which they are reached, and of the gauges by which progress towards them are measured. We 
noted along the way that most discourse about fair life chances – including Fishkin’s 
conceptualization – is destination-focused. This matters. The next section helps unpack this 
further, in the context of childhood. 
 
 
Unfair life chances for children: two dimensions 
 
Approaching life chances there are, of course, good reasons to gauge a person’s life later in 
the life course – from which perspective, we have a fuller sense of its overall trajectory and 
defining stages. But there are problems inherent with looking exclusively backwards through 
the life course, in this context. One is that it carries with it a built-in bias towards destinations 
arrived at later in life, and highest achievements – both of loom largest through (as it were) a 
rear-view mirror. From this angle, considering the adult that a child becomes will seem to 
afford a more complete assessment of life chances available and taken, than considering their 
childhood in itself. Yet there are strong reasons to do just that, as many have pointed out from 
different disciplinary directions (Lister 2016; Bradshaw 2016; Layard and Dunn 2009; 
Gheaus 2015). For in the rearview mirror, what happens in childhood matters principally in 
terms of its ultimate effects on adulthood – so that childhood may appear to have value only 
as an intermediary state, to the extent that it issues in a good adulthood.  
 
But there are strong grounds for treating childhood as a stage with intrinsic value. Some 
reflect the claim that fulfillment for children may in some respects take different forms than it 
does for adults. So what it is for a child of 13 to have beneficial life chances is different from, 
rather than just an incomplete version of, what counts as fulfillment for adults. There are 
various ways in which such a claim might be substantiated. One is qualitative: to stress that 
children may possess capacities that adults have lost – for example, for open-mindedness, 
experimentation and fast learning – and which are distinctly employable in childhood, rather 
than just of instrumental value in developmental terms (Gopnik et al 2008; Gheaus 2015). So 
to judge children’s flourishing according to adult standards may simply miss those elements 
of fulfillment which are attainable better – or indeed exclusively – in childhood. Another is 
chronological: to emphasise the extent to which chances taken in childhood and experiences 
gained in childhood are valuable at the time, during childhood, irrespective of whether they 
are also valuable later – and would hold that intrinsic value even if (for example) the lifespan 
were cut short. Seeing childhood in terms of ‘waiting’ for adulthood (Qvortup 2004) may 
simply miss those senses in which it is a time when opportunities are already taken, 
flourishing is already achieved. And a third, distinctly moral consideration is that viewing 
children only as ‘becomings’ rather than as ‘beings’ in their own right devalues childhood as 
a stage in the life course, relative to others. Giving human beings equal moral consideration 
requires that fairness should apply across the life course, rather than only, or predominantly, 
to certain designated sections.  
 
None of this should be taken as denying that children are both beings and becomings, nor that 
experiences in childhood have implications for fulfillment in adulthood (as if they were 
ontologically disconnected), nor that childhood should weigh more heavily in our 
consideration of the fair distribution of life chances. But it does amount to a clear case, in 
those considerations, for weighing childhood ‘as a stage of life, with its own value’ (Child 
Poverty Action Group 2016, p.2). Writing at the time of Cameron’s then-nascent but 
ultimately thwarted ‘Life Chances Strategy’, Ruth Lister noted the absence of any 
appreciation of ‘the importance of a fulfilling and flourishing childhood’ in ministerial 
speeches on the matter (2016: 4). That absence persists. For example, while the Life Chances 
Act 2010 (as renamed and amended in mid-2016) addresses measures of childhood 
deprivation alongside obligations (on the part of the Social Mobility Commission) to promote 
social mobility, it does not explicitly relate the two – and neither does it address whether the 
conception of life chances (which itself goes undefined, as a term) applies to children 
themselves, as children. Without speaking to this absence, we lack the analytic scope either to 
tackle questions of fairness attaching to the achievement of life chances in childhood, or to 
assess the extent to which, at least in some cases, the pursuit of fulfilment in current 
childhood and future adulthood may be at odds with each other. 
 
That last point is significant, just because so much of the assessment of children’s well-being 
will typically be conducted on the basis of their future adulthood. Examples may help 
reinforce why there are strong reasons, from the point of view of ‘fair life chances’, to hold 
those in a more balanced perspective. One kind of case would be where short-term sacrifices 
are made for longer-term gain, and where the nature of those gains is itself presumed to 
justify those sacrifices. For example, an educational regime based entirely on achieving 
maximally high scores at certain stages may be vindicated in terms of any life chance 
indicator focusing on levels of educational attainment. The end would justify the means, even 
if at the expense of neglecting pedagogical goals measured otherwise than in test scores – for 
example the nurturing of creativity, individuality and diversity in students. (This picture has 
familiarly been applied to the educational régime in South Korea, with its globally excellent 
outcomes but apparent human costs. See Park (2014) for a critical discussion of this view.) It 
is one thing to debate whether those expenses are worth it, for the graduating students – 
whether they gain more, in life chances terms, from their high scores than they lose in 
diminished creativity or other educational roads not taken. But viewed from the point of view 
of flourishing in childhood, that dilemma barely figures. For if it is the fulfilment of children 
as children which is in focus, the ‘life chances’ costs will clearly outweigh the gains, simply 
insofar as such gains as do accrue are, however great, deferred until adulthood – and the costs 
in terms of lost individuality are both heavy and immediate (even if also longer-lasting). This 
is not to say that there is never a good ‘fair life chances’ case for promoting, among children, 
deferred or longer-term benefits over those accessible during childhood itself. But it is one 
way of making sense of a case which would say that any educational régime which is punitive 
in terms of its burden on children’s well-being or fulfilment cannot simply be justified in 
terms of deferred benefits even from the point of view of a life-chances agenda. 
 
Another example, this time related to work: imagine a multi-talented child encouraged to 
specialize, on the basis of future employment prospects. He has a rare suite of talents across 
the domains of a liberal education, with an aptitude for sport just as much as academic work, 
and for art alongside mechanics. He is strongly motivated to maintain these many ‘strings to 
his bow’, rather than channeling his time and emotional investment into a single avenue. He 
maintains this motivation in spite of advice that he will lose earnings and status in later life, 
by not strategically specializing his interests, and so letting some go. His stance is reflexive 
and informed. From his own point of view, he would rather earn the median wage, in a job of 
relatively low status, than take a narrow route to high status and high income. In the end, he 
gets his way: teachers and parents relent, and support him in maintaining his broad range of 
interests and aptitudes, even though this means sacrificing academic grades for sake of saving 
time for pursuits beyond school. This he does – and indeed, settles contentedly into the low-
status, medium-waged career he anticipated. How has he fared, in terms of fulfilment of life 
chances? Obviously, picking up a single yardstick (say, school grades or professional status) 
does him few favours given his juggling of different domains of achievement – so his story 
backs up the desirability of a pluralistic measure. But there is a deeper point here, from the 
point of view of being and becoming. His choices in childhood may have compromised his 
life chances in some respects, but they have just as clearly enhanced them in others. He has 
maintained interests he found fulfiling in childhood, and found fulfilment in carrying forward 
this range of aptitudes, despite the likelihood that they will diminish his future status and 
wealth, and is fully accepting of this. To make full sense of his situation in life chances terms 
means weighing his childhood self alongside his adult self. His childhood decisions and 
flourishing are not incidental to, nor instrumental to, how his adulthood takes shape – but are 
part of our understanding of the value he places on how his life chances have been used. 
Again, the point here is not that we should automatically privilege either childhood or 
adulthood, but rather that we should weigh both as the distinctive stages they are, when 
considering how fairness.    
 
So a society where children’s life chances were really fair, would address children as ‘beings’ 
as well as ‘becomings’, consider the role of life chances from each perspective, and would 
apply plural measures of ‘life chances’. This tells us something of the conceptual background 
to that society: painting in key aspects of how a fleshed-out account of children’s life chances 
would work. But what policy directions might we find? The next section proposes three such 
directions.  
 
 
Real fairness: three key priorities 
 
The eradication of child poverty 
A realistic strategy for fair life chances for children would prioritise the eradication of child 
poverty. This is for two main reasons, among many possible others. One is that poverty 
experienced in childhood has as big an impact as any other phenomenon on children’s life 
chances. An extensive review of evidence cross a range of outcomes, children from low-
income households fare worse in part because of low income (Cooper and Stewart 2013). 
Those impacts apply across the domains subject to any plausible plural measure. They also 
reverberate across both of the two dimensions addressed in the previous section. Succinctly: 
‘poor children are more likely to be behind their peers in education, have poorer health and 
risk chronic illnesses in later life, have a shorter lifespan and may even be more likely to die 
on the roads’ (Garnham 2016: xii). Because countries with the highest levels of child poverty 
have the lowest levels of social mobility, the life chances chances of those born poor start 
lower, and remain so (Blanden 2009; Layard 2009). The other reason is that child poverty is 
definitively unfair to children. This question is quite separate from long-running political 
debates about whether the causes of poverty in general should be located at the level of socio-
economic structure or individual character and volition, or somewhere in between. Poverty is 
visited upon children: it does not flow from their life choices, and they cannot be held 
responsible for it. Because of its effects on life chances through childhood and adulthood, it is 
exemplary of why unfairness in childhood is particularly urgent: poverty wields potentially 
deep negative influence on children’s well-being and well-becoming, in ways entirely 
unrelated to any considerations of merit or desert (Schweiger and Graf 2015; Calder 2016; 
Armstrong 2017). 
 
Yet politically, the framing of life chances talk has distracted from this. Replacing ‘Child 
Poverty’ with ‘Life Chances’ in the naming of relevant UK legislation was not just an 
innocent change in terminology, but part of an explicit shift in focus from economic and 
structural factors to individual, cultural and relationship-based aspects of the generation of 
what Cameron called the ‘opportunity gap’ between poorer and richer children (Cameron 
2016). The revised act removed the commitment to eliminate child poverty by 2020, and 
shifted the official measures of child poverty from a set based on income and material 
deprivation to one tracking a more heterogeneous set of ‘life chances’ indicators, including 
educational attainment and long-term worklessness. The argument from Iain Duncan Smith, 
architect of the change, was that income measures are crude, and that it would be more 
representative to focus on the ‘barriers people face when trying to improve their own situation 
– whether that be problems of debt, relationship breakdown, poor education, addiction or 
something else’ (as quoted in Stone 2016). While this may sound conducive to the adoption 
of a plural measure, from the evidence of Cooper and Stewart it mistakes symptoms for 
causes, and so will neither track unequal life chances accurately nor facilitate their evening 
up. A claim that life chances are manifested in a variety of ways does not entail a claim that 
about the conditions conducive to their realization. Because there is overwhelming evidence 
that inequalities in income are foundational to the uneven distribution of children’s life 
chances, a realistic strategy for making that distribution fairer would start with eradicating 
child poverty. 
 
The revaluation of childcare 
Childcare – in the broad sense of the care of children – also straddles the dimensions of 
current childhood and future adulthood, in relation to children’s life chances. While all human 
beings need and benefit from care relationships, the needs and benefits are especially acute 
among children. Partly, those needs reflect children’s distinct vulnerability, in physical, 
mental and social terms – and so the extent to which children are particularly dependent on 
their relations with others. The implications of those care relations for life chances are so 
multifarious and extensive as to be beyond listing. If life chances subsist in the relationship 
between individuals and the social structures they inhabit, then childcare is fundamental to the 
playing-out of that relationship. Access to it is a fairness issue. This will be obvious in 
connection with the life chances of parents, because the costs of childcare will fall most 
heavily on the worst off, and the balance between work and domestic roles carries such clear 
implications for the dynamics of parents’ relations with each other (Calder 2018; Butler and 
Rutter 2016; Hartas 2014). Yet the availability and quality of childcare holds consequential 
impacts for children themselves, foundational to their life chances both in chronological terms 
(because they matter so early in the life course) and qualitatively. Parent-child relations are of 
course difficult to standardize, and may be presumed to be a matter of discretion, with 
families as provinces of parental autonomy as regards to how childrearing unfolds, except in 
cases where there is risk of clear harm to the child. This assumption seems in direct tension 
with any principle of fair life chances for children, simply insofar as families’ different 
decisions, circumstances and priorities will lead to widely varying patterns of upbringing for 
children living in them (Fishkin 1983; Calder 2016, ch. 1). This is not itself a reason to 
prioritise life chances over family autonomy. But to the extent that we support fair life 
chances, it gives compelling grounds on which to balance out inequalities arising from family 
autonomy with a robust framework for levelling the playing field in terms of childcare. 
Specific provisions such as universal, regulated nursery provision will be a clear plank, 
because of their capacity to compensate for families’ different levels of resources. But a wider 
cultural shift, in which the rearing of children is seen not as a privatized, individualized 
matter but as a commitment by society as a whole, with the costs to be borne cooperatively 
rather than by individual families, would be vital in furnishing the conditions under which 
uneven access to childcare did not systematically disadvantage some children in early and 
enduring ways (Engster 2015; Sevenhuijsen 1998) . 
 
 
Opportunity pluralism 
We have found accumulating reasons for the importance of a plural measure of life chances. 
The corollary of this is the importance of real opportunities, which people can actually use to 
achieve the goods reflected in those measures. One way to look at what that kind of 
opportunity pluralism would look like has been offered by Fishkin. He bills it as a way of 
mitigating unearned advantage, lowering the stakes of those merit-based competitions where 
some win and others lose (like those for access to high-ranking professions) and opening up 
space for people to pursue more paths throughout life (Fishkin 2014: 131). Crucial to it is the 
removal of what he calls ‘bottlenecks’, where opportunities are restricted by the congestion 
caused by narrow points of entry to situations which then bestow the opportunity to pursue a 
wide range of valued goods (Fishkin 2014: 13). Such a society would look like this. There 
would be a wide range of diverse goals and conceptions of flourishing; avoiding as far as 
possible these goods and roles being positional and competitive (so that one person’s access 
to them entails as little as possible another person’s lack of access), and a plurality of paths 
leading to them. As we saw in our earlier discussion of his definition of ‘fair life chances’, 
Fishkin takes a ‘whole life course’ perspective. It is not specifically directed at fairness for 
children. But there are clear reasons why it would have benefits there.  
 
Chief among them perhaps is that the widening of opportunities for flourishing helps maintain 
a balance between the two dimensions of life chances discussed above. A society in which the 
most diverse array of destinations are recognized as valid and valuable is one where 
childhood is proportionately less likely to be regarded as a period of sacrifice for later gain, a 
means to the end of a successful adulthood, or a kind of laboratory for the achievement of the 
kinds of credentials which equip a child for a narrower range. Sociological studies have 
shown how prioritization of later success can lead to micro-managed, intensive modes of 
parenting specifically geared towards the cultivation of capital to be redeemed at the point of 
application for university, and thereafter for higher-status jobs (Lareau 2011). They have 
shown too that (again) simply being better off carries its own educational advantages (Hartas 
2011). Opportunity pluralism – particularly, the diversification of routes to flourishing – 
would help make such variations more innocuous, and less detrimental to destination-based 
life chances. But they would also have the effect of allowing for a reassessment of the value 
of childhood itself – and make scope, for example, for the creative enjoyment of childhood as 
a time in its own right for which, as we saw earlier, children have been shown to have a 
particular cognitive aptitude, and which may have opportunities attached to it which are 
valuable in themselves even if perhaps running counter to the realization of other longer-term 
outcomes (see Bonotti and Calder, forthcoming). Flourishing in childhood is not best or 
simply served by regarding it as a period of limitation and sacrifice, for the sake of later 
gains.  
 
Conclusion 
A fair life chances agenda has a clear and pressing point to it in a society such as the 
contemporary UK, where life chances for children are unevenly distributed in ways without 
moral or political justification. Yet the term needs to be carefully and critically elaborated, to 
hold genuine critical bite and to contribute to a coherent policy agenda. Our discussion here 
has not, of course, provided a full picture of a society where children’s life chances were 
genuinely fair. Instead it has aimed to provide some tools with which we might paint a fuller 
picture – and, by way of policy directions, provide examples of some necessary features of 
the landscape. There is of course much more to be done, in terms of developing such tools, 
and fleshing out a wider policy landscape. But I hope to have shown, in this discussion, is the 
mistakenness of any assumption that ‘fairer life chances’ is a light commitment in political 
terms, or might be done without confronting major structural factors such as economic 
inequalities, or might be an easy step from our current conjuncture. It is a project which 
justifies being taken seriously only in so far as it is treated in far more radical terms than that.  
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